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“. . . the very existence of racial discrimination of the type practised
by the Law School may impede the narrowing of the LSAT testing
gap. [..] Whites scoring between 163 and 167 on the LSAT are
routinely rejected by the Law School, and thus whites aspiring to
admission at the Law School have every incentive to improve their
score to levels above that range. [..] Blacks, on the other hand, are
nearly guaranteed admission if they score above 155.[..] there is no
incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the LSAT
once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score.”
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Thomas
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
I. Introduction
In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme Court approved the use of race as a factor in the
admissions decisions of the Law School of the University of Michigan in order to obtain educational
benefits from a diverse student body. In practice this landmark ruling leaves the door open for a
holistic background-sighted admissions policy allowing a less academically qualified candidate to
be preferred in order to achieve diversity. 
Opponents of diversify-conscious admissions policies often claim that students subject to
preferential treatment have less incentive to put in effort to achieve higher academic quality. The
students are therefore more likely to be polarized in quality based on their group affiliation. In the
job market this may aggravate statistical discrimination. Justice Thomas argues that such Phelps
(1972) style discrimination is likely to be exacerbated by affirmative action in the admissions process
“either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise
unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who
would succeed without discrimination.”1 
However in an all-pay auction framework Fu (2006) finds that affirmative action creates
positive cross-group interaction between applicants. It helps level the playing field inducing
2Furstenberg (2005) has the same conclusion in a very different framework where racial
identity contains relevant information about the applicant’s true ability.   
3The Supreme Court ruled out this rigid scoring practice in Gratz v. Bollinger (2003).
Whether diversity conscious admissions policy is officially announced as a rigid scoring rule or
simply perceived by students as an additional bonus makes no difference for the purposes of this
paper. 
4While our discussion focuses on the case of the US, the existence of socioeconomic tiers
is surely not unique to the US. For instance, in an effort to foster social mobility the National
University of Ireland Maynooth adds 50 points out of 600 to the admissions score of students who
can document that they are from a disadvantaged socioeconomic background. NUIM is one of the
eight Higher Education Institutions in Ireland that participates in the Higher Education Access Route
Program (HEAR). See http://access.nuim.ie/scope/hear.
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candidates from both disadvantaged and advantaged backgrounds to invest more heavily in
educational attainment. Even if the college is purely academic-quality oriented, the optimal
admissions policy gives preferential treatment to the applicant from a disadvantaged background.2
Furthermore the college’s objective of academic excellence is not in conflict with diversity. Diversity
is simply a byproduct of the optimal admissions policy of a purely academic quality oriented college.
We also examine the effect of a preferential treatment rule on student incentives where
students with diverse backgrounds compete for a scarce place. We depart from Fu (2006) in the form
of the preferential treatment. Fu (2006) examines affirmative action policies with a multiplicative
form: The “academic achievement score” of a candidate from an underprivileged background is
multiplied by a constant greater than one. However preferential treatment policies often take, or may
be perceived to take, an additive form. For example, the undergraduate admissions office of the
College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Michigan added 20 points (out of 150) to the
underprivileged candidate’s score.3 Espenshade, Chung and Walling (2004) estimates that in ten
academically selective US universities on average the admissions policies implicitly add 230 extra
SAT points (on a 1600 scale) to the scores of African American students.4 Hence we analyze
preferential treatment with an additive form.
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We find that the exact form of the preferential treatment admissions policy matters. If an
additive form is adopted, strong preferential treatment must be implemented in order to improve
diversity. However with strong preferential treatment the expected academic achievement of the
disadvantaged student falls, widening the intergroup score gap, sacrificing academic excellence and
possibly exasperating statistical discrimination in the job market. If the preferential treatment is mild,
it leaves the expected academic achievement of the disadvantaged student unaltered while the
advantaged student puts in more effort. In equilibrium, this simply leads to a higher score gap
between students from different backgrounds without improving student-body diversity. Our
predictions contrast with Fu’s and support the views of Justice Thomas. This is due to the difference
in the incentive structure in the two preferential treatment rules. 
This difference between the effects of additive and multiplicative affirmative action is in
contrast to Chan and Eyster (2003) which finds that an additive affirmative action policy is optimal
and equivalent to multiplicative policy if the applicant effort distribution is independent of the
admissions policy. Fryer and Loury (2005) also finds that an additive rule is optimal to achieve
academic excellence. However in contrast to our paper, in Fryer and Loury (2005) the college does
not internalize students’ response to affirmative action and students do not interact strategically.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that at the top end of the performance distribution students often
compete with classmates for admissions to selective universities. This may be due to the perception
that elite colleges rarely accept more than one or two students from the same class. California and
Florida guarantee a spot in the state university system for the top 4% and top 20% students of their
highschool respectively. These sort of policies induce further head-to-head competition between
students within the highschool. 
We find that if students respond to the admissions policy and colleges internalize this
response, the exact structure of preferential treatment matters. A multiplicative preferential treatment
policy increases the marginal benefit of effort from a disadvantaged candidate. This induces greater
academic effort on his part and in equilibrium this results in a greater probability that he will be
5Affirmative action in all public colleges is banned either by court order, by referendum  or
by Governor’s initiative in California (1996), Louisiana (1996), Mississippi (1996), Texas (1996),
Washington (1998), Florida (2000) and Georgia (2001).     
6See Fryer and Loury (2005) for a survey of studies documenting the atmosphere of
confusion about the aim of affirmative action policies and how they are implemented.
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admitted. On the other hand, an additive affirmative action policy does not alter the marginal benefit
of effort for a disadvantaged candidate. The bonus points are added irrespective of the performance
of the student. Hence it does not incentivize the student to put in additional effort.
Affirmative action policy was a ballot measure in two states in the 2008 U.S. elections. While
Colorado voted for affirmative action (51%), Nebraska voted against it (58%). Public opinion is
divided on the question of affirmative action with the opponents gaining momentum.5 While some
might oppose affirmative action based on their philosophical standing, others may do so due to the
perceived practice of it.6 Whether the policy is in place as an affirmative action policy or as a
diversity-conscious admissions policy, it is important to pay attention to the incentive effects that it
will induce. We find that the exact implementation of the policy can dramatically alter its effects. Our
paper together with Fu’s suggests that when contestants are able to react to the allocation policy, it
should be tailored to increase the marginal benefit of effort for disadvantaged candidates.
We analyze three measures that are frequently cited as goals for admission policy. It is often
considered desirable for admissions policy to improve student quality, to create a diverse student
body and to reduce the academic polarization of student achievement based on group affiliation.
However, we show that these three goals are not mutually inclusive consequences of admissions
policies that give preferential treatment to one of the groups of students whether additive or
multiplicative. However, if the discrepancy in the academic achievement of students from different
socioeconomic backgrounds is at least partially generated due asymmetry in cost of effort and in net
7Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) argues that the performance gap may also be due to peer
pressure. Among minorities, aspiring to achieve may be labeled as “acting white” and may be a
cause of rejection from the social peer group. 
8For instance, Trinity College in Dublin admits a percentage of students from the Republic
of Ireland and from Northern Ireland equal to the percentage of applicants from each group.
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value from education, policies that target the source of the problem can yield improvement in all three
policy goals at once.7     
It will be useful to introduce some terminology that will be employed throughout the paper:
A college with a “fully diversified student body” has the percentage of admitted students from a
disadvantaged background and from an advantaged background equal to percentage of applicants
from each group.8 A “purely academic quality-oriented college” sets the admissions policy to
maximize the expected academic achievement of the admitted student. The “score gap” is the
difference between the expected academic achievement of advantaged and disadvantaged students.
Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium
implications of the model. Section 4 discusses student-body diversity and academic excellence.
Section 5 concludes. 
II. The Model
There are two risk-neutral applicants for one seat at a college: an applicant from a disadvantaged
background (D) and an applicant from an advantaged background (A). Each applicant has a valuation
Vi0(0,4) œ i0{A,D} of a place in college.  Applicants’ academic efforts ei result in a test score qi via
a non-stochastic symmetric linear technology qi=ei œi0{D,A). The unit cost of effective effort is
ciœi0{D,A). The value to cost ratio is asymmetric where  . The asymmetry may be becauseA D
A D
V V
c c
>
cD>cA, for instance students from a disadvantaged background lack access to effective tutorials for
the SAT. The asymmetry may also arise because VA>VD. This may occur due to perceived inequality
in opportunities for the candidates in the post-college job market. Often students coming from an
underprivileged socioeconomic background have less promising job prospects for a variety of
9Based on statistics published by the Census Bureau, in 2003 black males with a bachelors
degree had a median income of $41.916 which was 82% of the $51,138 median income of similarly
educated white males. The American Association of University Woman presents a table with a state
by state estimate of median earnings of men and women with a college degree or more in year round
full-time work for the period 2004-2006 (see www.aauw.org). The national earnings gap is 24%.
10If then even if the advantaged candidate exerts a level of effort with cost equal/A AV cγ >
to his valuation and the disadvantaged candidate exerts no effort, the disadvantaged candidate will
still win.  Thus with such an extreme affirmative action policy neither candidate would exert any
effort and the place would go to the disadvantaged applicant. Likewise if  the equilibrium/D DV cγ < −
has neither candidate exerting any effort and the place going to the advantaged applicant.
11Rather than modeling the competition between students, Epple, Romano and Sieg (2008)
model competition between colleges using financial aid.
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reasons. Examples range from overt discrimination to the more subtle, such as statistical
discrimination, a lack of social networks or a lack of mainstream business community approved
mannerisms.9 Additionally applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds may find the monetary cost
of attending a selective university more onerous.  The payoff to the applicant is Vi-ciei if he gets
accepted and -ciei if he is rejected.
 We examine admission policies where the college adds a fixed number of points
 to the score of the disadvantaged applicant.10 The college admits the applicant D if( ),D AD AV VC cγ ∈ −
qD+(>qA, it admits the applicant A if qD+(<qA, and randomly assigns the seat in case of equality. It
is possible to present the results much more concisely if we define f as the applicant who is favored
by the admissions policy and u as the applicant who is unfavored by the policy. So if ($0, the
admissions policy favors students from a disadvantaged background f=D and u=A.  If the college
favors students from a privileged background such as giving priority to children of alumnae then (<0
and f=A and u=D. Since the cost of effort is sunk irrespective of the identity of the winner, the
resulting competition for the seat in the college takes the same form as an all-pay auction.11
In our framework, the college adds a fixed number of points to the score of the student subject
to preferential treatment, whereas in Fu (2006) the affirmative action policy is multiplicative. While
-7-
the two models are basically identical except for the exact procedure of preferential treatment, the
equilibrium implications will prove to be distinctly different. 
We adapt the preferential treatment all-pay auction of Konrad (2002) to allow for asymmetric
valuations of the prize and cost of effort. As in Konrad equilibrium does not exist in pure strategies.
The best response to an effort of e! of the favored applicant is either to put  |(| more effort than the
rival or to drop out of the race altogether, so e! would not be optimal. In Konrad (2002) the bidder
with the head-start advantage (the favored student in our framework) always has a positive expected
value from the contest and the bidder without the head-start advantage has an expected value of zero.
When students have different valuation to cost ratios this is not always the case depending on the
intensity of the preferential treatment. Hence we need to study the equilibrium in two separate cases.
Lemma 1: The equilibrium is only in mixed-strategies and it is characterized by unique probability
density functions Ff(e) and Fu(e) for the favored applicant’s and the unfavored applicant’s academic
effort, respectively. These distributions are continuous in ( ) , .D AD AV Vc cγ γ∀ ∈ −
(i) If the admissions policy favors the advantaged applicant, or if the policy( ),0DDVcγ ∈ −
“strongly favors” the disadvantaged applicant, , the unique equilibrium( ),A D AA D AV V Vc c cγ ∈ −
distribution functions are given by:
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(ii) If the admissions policy “mildly favors” the disadvantaged candidate , the0, A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
unique equilibrium distribution functions are given by:
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The unique equilibrium given in Lemma 1 can be derived using standard methods as in Hillman and
Riley (1989). The proof is presented in the Appendix.
III. Equilibrium Implications
With a group-blind admissions policy ((=0), in equilibrium the student from an underprivileged
background is less aggressive than the student from a privileged background due to the higher cost
of effort and/or lower expected return from the degree. With a positive probability the disadvantaged
student simply chooses not to put in any effort due to his dim prospects (the probability mass at zero
in Lemma 1). Hence a student from a privileged background has a chance of facing such a weak
competitor. This implies that in equilibrium, for the same level of effort the student from an
underprivileged background has a lower chance of being admitted than the student from a privileged
background. 
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Proposition 1: With a group-blind admissions policy, (=0, with the same effort an applicant from
a disadvantaged background has a lower chance of being admitted than an applicant from an
advantaged background, for any level of effort below the suprimum of the equilibrium
support, ( )0, .DDVce∈
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. It is straightforward to derive the expected scores and
the admissions probabilities of the applicants implied by the equilibrium distribution functions when
there is preferential treatment. 
Lemma 2:  If the admissions policy implements additive preferential treatment where the favored
student is admitted when qf>qu-|(| then:  
a. If the admissions policy favors the student from an advantaged background (the student
with the high valuation to cost ratio), , then the stronger the preference( ),0DDVcγ ∈ −
(i) the lower is the expected academic achievement of students from both
backgrounds.
(ii) the less diverse is the student body. 
b. If  the admissions policy mildly favors the candidate from a disadvantaged background (the
student with the low valuation to cost ratio), , then 0, A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
(i) it has no effect on the expected academic achievement of the disadvantaged
student.
(ii) it cannot achieve full diversity of the student body and a stronger preference in
this range has no effect on the diversity of the student body.
     (iii) it widens the test score gap. 
c. If the admissions policy strongly favors the candidate from a disadvantaged background
(the student with the low valuation to cost ratio), ( ),A D AA D AV V Vc c cγ ∈ −
(i) it can achieve fully diversity of the student body.
(ii) but it results in decreased expected academic achievement of the disadvantaged
student compared to a group-blind policy.
   
The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix. Figure 1 and 2 graph the expected academic achievements
of the students from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds as a function of the preferential
treatment parameter. Figure 3 gives the probability of acceptance of the unfavored applicant.
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The admissions policy may favor the applicant from a privileged background (Lemma 2 part a) as
is often implemented by giving priority to a list of feeder schools or to applicants who have alumnae
parents. In this case, the expected academic achievement of students from both backgrounds
deteriorates. The student from the privileged background can guarantee a victory by engaging in an
effort level of  , since the applicant from the disadvantaged background would never put| |D
D
V
c γ−
in effort that would cost him more than his valuation of the prize, VD. This leaves the privileged
applicant in an advantageous position in the competition both due to his higher valuation to cost ratio
and due to the admissions policy that favors him. In equilibrium he has a positive excepted payoff
of  .  A stronger preferential treatment tilts the playing field further in his favor.( )| |D
D
V
A A cV c γ− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
This induces the candidate from the disadvantaged background to become less aggressive. In return,
the high-valuation candidate also puts less effort. In equilibrium, the probability of admissions of the
high-valuation applicant improves, reducing the diversity of the student body.
If the admissions policy mildly favors the disadvantaged candidate (Lemma 2 part b), the
effort distribution of the applicant from the disadvantaged background does not depend on the
/1
2 /
D D
A A
V c
V c
−
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preferential treatment parameter (see Lemma 1). However it shifts the effort distribution of the high-
valuation candidate to the right by (, the amount of the bonus added to the other candidate’s score.
Mildly favoring the applicant from a disadvantaged background induces the advantaged student to
study more aggressively in order to overcome the preferential treatment. In equilibrium, the
probabilities of admissions remain unchanged, since the greater effort of the applicant from the
privileged background simply offsets the preferential treatment of the admissions rule. Hence mild
preferential treatment has no effect on the diversity of the student body but it widens the score gap.
This result is different from Fu (2006) which finds that the  probability of acceptance of the
candidate from the disadvantaged background improves when subject to mild multiplicative
affirmative action. Multiplicative preferential treatment boosts the marginal benefit of effort for the
disadvantaged applicant. However, with additive preferential treatment, as in this paper, the bonus
points are added irrespective of the performance of the student. Hence the student from the
disadvantaged background  does not have an additional incentive to put in effort. 
Finally, if the admissions policy strongly favors the applicant from a disadvantaged
background (Lemma 2 part c), applicant D never needs to put in effort greater than   in order| |A
A
V
c γ−
to win the seat in college since the candidate from an advantaged background never puts in effort
greater than  given that his valuation of the seat is VA. This gives applicant D an advantage in the
A
A
V
c
competition leaving him a positive expected payoff of . A stronger preference tilts( )| |AAVD D cV c γ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
the playing field further in favor of applicant D and induces less aggressive competition. In
equilibrium the probability of admissions of the student from a disadvantaged background goes up.
IV. Student-Body Diversity and Academic Excellence 
Below we discuss the optimal choice of ( under two different objective functions. We first analyze
the optimal preferential treatment parameter for a purely academic quality oriented college that
maximizes the expected academic achievement of the admitted student.  We then analyze the optimal
choice for a college that aims at full student-body diversification.
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Proposition 2: A preferential treatment admissions rule where   maximizes the expectedˆ A D
A D
V V
c cγ = −
academic quality of the incoming class. This policy increases the expected score of an admitted
student from an advantaged background but does not change the expected score of an admitted
student from a disadvantaged background. Despite the preferential treatment for the student from
the disadvantaged background, it does not improve student body diversity.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. 
Even if the college is indifferent toward diversity and cares solely about the academic quality
of the incoming class, the college employs an admissions policy that mildly favors the candidate from
the disadvantaged background. To overcome this mild preference, the candidate from the advantaged
background puts in more effort which results in higher quality admissions.
Mild preference for disadvantaged students sounds as if it would be beneficial to applicants
from underprivileged backgrounds. However with additive preferential treatment such a policy would
not help them. In equilibrium, mild preferential treatment leaves student body diversity unchanged
and the disadvantaged student is no more likely to get admitted than with an admissions policy that
is background blind. But the policy results in a greater inter-group score gap in the admitted class.
In expectation, students are therefore more polarized in quality based on their group affiliation. In the
job market this is likely to aggravate statistical discrimination.
With a multiplicative affirmative action rule Fu (2006) finds the academic-quality-maximizing
choice of admissions policy yields full diversification as a byproduct. Hence there is no tension
between academic quality and diversity. This is not the case with an additive preferential treatment
policy. 
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Proposition 3:  The admissions rule where  achieves full student-body( )( )1/ 2 ˆA A DA A DV V Vc c cγ γ= − >
diversity. This policy induces less effort by the student from a disadvantaged background compared
to a group-blind admissions policy. It also leads to a higher score gap than a group-blind admissions
policy.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix.
A group-blind  admissions policy (=0, results in a higher percentage of advantaged students
being admitted than their representation in the applicant pool.  Due to the higher valuation of the prize
and or lower cost of effort the student from an advantaged background puts more effort in expectation
and has a higher probability of acceptance. In order to achieve a diverse student body the college must
implement strong preferential treatment in favor of the disadvantaged student. When  theˆγ γ γ= >
probability that the disadvantaged student is admitted is ½. Achieving student body diversity through
an additive admissions preference comes at a cost. Due to the strong preferential treatment the
disadvantaged candidate can relax which leads to a greater score gap between advantaged and
disadvantaged students.
With multiplicative affirmative action, the optimal policy that maximizes academic excellence
also yields student body diversity (Fu, 2006), however the score gap is increased. Thus the longer term
repercussions of either type of preferential treatment admissions policy may be to exacerbate statistical
discrimination against students from underprivileged socioeconomic backgrounds. In order to increase
diversity without increasing the student score gap or sacrificing academic quality one needs to directly
address the underlying causes of the problem.
Proposition 4: As long as the valuation to cost of effort ratio of the student from the underprivileged
background is not too low, , policies that decrease the cost of effort and/or increase/ / 2D D A AV c V c>
the net value of education to the student from the underprivileged background will address all three
goals of increasing diversity, increasing academic excellence and decreasing the score gap.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix.
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The lack of equal representation in college and the inter-group score gap are equilibrium
results which arise from the underlying asymmetries in cost of effort and perceived value of college
education among students from different backgrounds. Any policy that alleviates these asymmetries
makes it a closer contest. This gives students from both backgrounds more incentive to put in effort.
Hence policies that attack the source of the problem also lead to an improvement in the academic
quality of the incoming class. While with diversity-conscience admissions policies there is a tradeoff
between the desirable properties of an incoming class, such a tradeoff does not present itself with
policies that help improve the job opportunities and reduce the cost of education to students from
underprivileged backgrounds.
 If the valuation to cost of effort ratio of the student from the underprivileged background is
too low, only two of the three goals can be reached with social policies that help/ / 2 ,D D A AV c V c<
reduce the cost of effort and increase the net value of education for students from disadvantaged
backgrounds. These policies always increase the quality of the incoming class and the diversity of the
student body but the student score gap may get worse before it improves. However note that this is
just an artifact of the score gap measure as it is traditionally calculated, as the absolute difference
between the scores. Take a situation where VD  is very low to begin with. Then the disadvantaged
student will have very low effort and so the advantaged student does not need to put a in high effort
either. Therefore in absolute terms the score gap will be small, because the scores themselves will be
low. As  social policies such as scholarships improve the net value of education to students from
disadvantaged backgrounds, the competition will be more intense and the scores of both students will
be higher. Thus for these very asymmetric cases the score gap will increase, measured in the
traditional manner as the difference in the scores of students. However the relative student score gap,
measured as the ratio of scores, always decreases as a result of these positive policies.
There are a wide variety of policies which directly address the underlying asymmetry between
students from different backgrounds. If applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds have higher costs
12In UK following the January 2009 report from Independent Commission on Social Mobility
(www.socialmobilitycommission.org) the government launched New Opportunities White Paper.
The plan includes a golden handshake to the most effective teachers in order to encourage them to
work at schools in socio-economically disadvantaged areas as well as a new guarantee for high
potential young people from low income backgrounds to get the help they need to get to university.
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of effort due to lack of access to effective schools or tutorials, these can be provided.12 Mentor
programs may be useful where applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds have low valuation for
college education due to lack of social networks or lack of business community approved mannerisms.
If disadvantaged applicants have low valuations due to the high monetary cost of selective colleges,
this can be addressed directly through scholarships. If the problem is arising due to statistical
discrimination in the post-college job market one should be particularly concerned about preferential
admissions policies which are likely to increase the student score gap.
V.  Conclusion
Students from a disadvantaged background may have a lower valuation of a degree in college and/or
a higher cost of an efficiency unit of effort compared to students from an advantaged background.
With a group-blind admissions policy, we find that for the same level of effort a student from an
underprivileged background has a lower chance of being admitted than a student from a privileged
background. The student body is not diversified and the score gap leaves the door open for long-term
statistical discrimination in the job market against students from a disadvantaged background. 
Public policy that directly addresses the underlying cause of the problem through scholarships,
loans, free SAT tutorials, or higher quality of schooling in disadvantaged areas can provide
improvement in academic quality, the score gap and diversity in college. Whereas preferential
treatment policies are cheap and easy to implement, all three goals are not mutually inclusive.
Furthermore, if preferential treatment policies are used they should be carefully designed so
that they increase the marginal benefit of effort for disadvantaged applicants. If they fail to do so they
-17-
may  give an incentive for the disadvantaged student to put in less effort. Contrary to one of its
intended consequences affirmative action can widen the performance gap further, possibly leading to
more severe statistical discrimination against disadvantaged students.
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APPENDIX: 
Claims 1 through 5 are used in the proof of Lemma 1.
CLAIM 1: When   there is no equilibrium in pure-strategies and neither applicant( ),D AD AV Vc cγ ∈ −
will  put any probability mass point on any level of effort greater than zero.
PROOF: Neither applicant will put any probability mass point on any effort greater than zero. Define
a range Eu as (0,x) where x is an arbitrary number greater than VN  /cN . Define  as the suprimum ofue′
Eu. Suppose the lowest mass point of applicant u in Eu is given by  Then applicant f would not* .u ue E∈
put any probability at as a slight increase in his effort would result in a discrete increase in* | |f ue e γ= −
the probability of winning. As there is no probability of  applicant u could lower his effort* | |,f ue e γ= −
slightly without changing his probability of winning. A similar argument rules out mass points for
applicant f on  Applicant u would not put any probability at Both players’(0, ).j je e ′∈ * .u fe e γ= +
engaging in zero effort cannot be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium either, since the best
response to eu=0 would be effort slightly higher than |(|. ~
CLAIM 2: Applicant u will put zero probability on .(0, ]ue γ∈
PROOF:  If applicant u contemplates  zero effort will win with the same probability as he(0, )ue γ∈
must exceed his rival’s effort by at least  in order to win. If  then he can win only if the otherγ ue γ=
exerts zero effort, in which case there is an even chance of winning. So if that effort level gave him
a nonnegative payoff he could double his chances of winning by a slight increase in his effort. And
if it gave him a negative payoff he could get a zero payoff by dropping his effort to zero.
~
CLAIM 3: If applicant u has an infimum effort level of zero. The( ) ( ), 0 ,D A D DD A D DV V V Vc c c cγ ∈ − ∪ −
expected value of the game to applicant u is zero.
PROOF:  Bidder u’s infimum effort must be less than Vu /cu since there can be no probability mass
at Vu /cu by Claim 1. Suppose that applicant u has an infimum effort of  Then applicant( )inf , .uuVu ce γ∈
f would never choose  If he did he would have positive effort and would lose for sure,inf0 .f ue e γ< ≤ −
since the probability of applicant u choosing exactly is zero in this range by Claim1. Thereforeinfue
applicant u could lower his infimum effort without changing the probability of winning.  Suppose that infue γ=
where applicant u was mixing in the open interval above |(| but not at |(|, by Claim 2. Then applicant
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f would never choose zero effort as this gives zero payoff and he can win for sure with effort of
  yielding a positive payoff. Take an effort level of  the probabilityu
u
V
c γ ε− + inf ,u ue e ε γ ε= + = +
that applicant u wins with this effort is  Since applicant f has no mass points on (0,f ( ) .f x dx
γ ε
γ γ+
+ −∫
,] by Claim 1, this probability is close to zero for small ,, yielding a negative expected payoff for
applicant u. Hence applicant u’s infimum effort cannot be |(|.  is not possible by Claim 2.inf (0, )ie γ∈
Therefore zero effort is in the support of the mixed strategy of applicant u.  At this effort level he loses
for sure, so the expected value of the game for applicant u must be zero. ~
CLAIM 4: If  applicant u has a suprimum effort of Vu /cu.  Applicant( ) ( ), 0 ,D A D DD A D DV V V Vc c c cγ ∈ − ∪ −
f has a suprimum effort of  The expected value of the game to applicant f is.u
u
V
c γ−( ) 0.u
u
V
f f cV c γ− − >
PROOF: Suppose that applicant u had a suprimum effort of  In that case applicant f wouldsup / .u u ue V c<
not set  as he can win for sure with that effort since either  or by Claimsupmax[0, ]f ue e γ> − supue γ<
1 the probability of applicant u choosing exactly is zero.  Therefore applicant u could win for suresupue
with  yielding a payoff greater than zero for small enough ,, a contradiction of Claim 3.supu ue e ε= +
Suppose that applicant f had a suprimum effort of  Then applicant u could win for suresup .f ue V γ< −
with  yielding a payoff greater than zero for small enough ,, a contradiction of Claimsupu fe e γ ε= + +
3.  Applicant f can win for sure with effort of since by Claim1 the probability of applicant uu
u
V
c γ−
choosing exactly  is zero.  Since  is in the support of his mixed strategy and he wins foru
u
V
c
u
u
V
c γ−
sure with that effort, the expected payoff for applicant f is ~( ).u
u
V
f f cV c γ− −
CLAIM 4: If the advantaged applicant has an infimum effort of (. The0, A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
disadvantaged applicant has an infimum effort of zero. The expected value of the game to the
disadvantaged applicant is zero.
PROOF: Applicant A can win for sure with an effort of yielding a payoff ofD
D
V
c γ+
 He would not choose zero effort since he would lose for sure.  is( ) 0.DDVA A cV c γ− + ≥ inf (0, )Ae γ∈
not possible by Claim 2.  would be a pure strategy with a pure strategy best reply byinf D
A D
V
ce γ= +
applicant D, but there cannot be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by Claim 1. Suppose that applicant
A has an infimum effort of  Then applicant D would never choose  If( )inf , .DDVA ce γ γ∈ + inf0 .D Ae e γ< ≤ −
she did she would be paying a positive amount and would lose for sure, since by Claim 1, the
probability of applicant A choosing exactly is zero in this range. Therefore, applicant A couldinfAe
lower his infimum effort without changing the probability of winning. Suppose applicant D had an
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infimum effort level of  then applicant A would never choose  If he did,(inf 0, D
D
V
D ce ⎤∈ ⎦ inf .A De e γ≤ +
he would lose for sure yielding a negative payoff. Since by Claim 1 the probability of applicant D
choosing exactly  is zero and he can always guarantee a positive payoff ofD
D
V
c
with effort of   But then applicant D would prefer zero effort to ( ) 0DDVA A cV c γ− + ≥ .DDVc γ+ inf .De
Therefore a effort of zero is in the support of the mixed strategy of applicant D.  At this effort she
loses for sure, so the expected value of the strategy for applicant D must be zero. ~
CLAIM 5: If  the advantaged applicant has a suprimum effort of   The0, A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦ .DDVc γ+
disadvantaged applicant has a suprimum effort of VD /cD . The expected value of the game to the
advantaged applicant is ( ) 0.DDVA A cV c γ− + ≥
PROOF: Suppose that applicant A had a suprimum effort of  Then applicant D wouldsup .D
D
V
A ce γ< +
never set  as he can win for sure with that effort since either  or by Claimsupmax[0, ]D Ae e γ> − supAe γ<
1 the probability of applicant A choosing exactly  is zero. Therefore applicant D could win forsupAe
sure with  yielding a payoff greater than zero for small enough a contradictionsupD Ae e γ ε= − + ,ε
of Claim 4. Suppose that applicant D had a suprimum effort of  Then applicant A wouldsup .D
D
V
D ce <
never set  since he could win for sure with  Therefore applicant D couldsupA De e γ> + sup .A De e γ= +
win for sure with  yielding a payoff greater than zero for small enough asupD De e ε= + ,ε
contradiction of Claim 4. By Claim 1, applicant A will win for sure with effort of  and it is,D
D
V
c γ+
in the support of his mixed strategy, so the expected value of the game to the advantaged applicant
is ~( )sup 0.D
D
V
A A A A A cV c e V c γ− = − − >
CLAIM 5: For the advantaged applicant, effort levels almost everywhere on  and for[ , ]A A Ae e e′ ′′∈
the disadvantaged applicant, effort levels almost everywhere on  must have positive[ , ],D D De b b′ ′′∈
probability, where
( )
( )
( )
, , 0,
0, , 0,
,0 0, ,  
A D A A A
A D A A A
A D D D
A D D D
D D D
D D D
V V V V V
A A D Dc c c c c
V V V V
A A D Dc c c c
V V V
A A D Dc c c
e e and e e
e e and e e
e e and e e
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
′ ′′ ′ ′′∀ ∈ − = = = = −
′ ′′ ′ ′′∀ ∈ − = = + = =
′ ′′ ′ ′′∀ ∈ − = = + = − =
PROOF: Suppose there were an interval of effort levels (t, s) in [eA', eA''] on which applicant A had
zero probability. Then applicant D would place zero probability on effort levels in (t-(, s-() since she
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could lower her effort to t-( and have the same chance of winning. But in this case applicant A would
never effort of  as he could lower his effort to t, saving in effort and losing onlys ε+ s tε+ −
in probability. By Claim 1 the loss in probability is negligible for smallF ( ) F ( )D Ds tε γ γ+ − − − .ε
So if there is an interval of zero probability it must go up to the top of the range, which depending on
the level of (, contradicts either Claim 4 or 5. A symmetric argument rules out ranges of zero
probability for applicant D in ~[ , ].D D De e e′ ′′∈
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Characterization of the Equilibrium. 
(i)    Claims 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that applicant u must be indifferent( ) ( ), 0 , .D A D DD A D DV V V Vc c c cγ ∈ − ∪ −
among effort levels almost everywhere in {0}c  and applicant f is indifferent among all(| |, uuVcγ ⎤⎦
effort levels almost everywhere in .  The expected value of the game to applicant u is zero0, | |u
u
V
c γ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
by Claim 3.  When he puts forth effort applicant u wins the place with value Vu only(| |, uuVce γ ⎤∈ ⎦
with the probability that applicant f puts forth effort less than e-|(|. Hence, Vu Ff(e-|(|)-cu e = 0. So,
and applicant f has a probability mass equal to at zero.  The( ) ( | |) 0, | | ,u u
u u
c V
f V cF e e eγ γ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + ∀ ∈ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
| |u
u
c
V
γ
expected value of the game to applicant f is by Claim 4. When he puts forth effort( )| |uuVf f cV c γ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
applicant f wins the place with value Vj  only with the probability that applicant u does0, | |uu
V
ce γ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
not exceed applicant f’s effort by more than |(|: So indifference implies
. Hence  and applicant u has( | |) | |u
u
V
f u f f f cV F e c e V cγ γ⎡ ⎤+ − = − −⎣ ⎦ (( ) | |, ,fu uu
c
cf u f V
u c
f
V V c e
F e e
V
γ− + ⎤= ∀ ∈ ⎦
a probability mass equal to  at zero effort.  And he puts zero probability on 
| |f
u
c
cf u f
f
V V c
V
γ− +
(0, ]γ
by Claim 2.
(ii)   In this case f=D and u=A.  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 5 show that applicant A is0, .A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
indifferent between effort levels almost everywhere in and applicant D is indifferent( , DDVcγ γ ⎤+ ⎦
between effort levels almost everywhere in .  The expected value of the game to applicant0, D
D
V
c⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
A is , by Claim 5.  When he exerts effort applicant A wins( )| |DDVA A cV c γ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦ (| |, | |DDVce γ γ ⎤∈ + ⎦
the place with value VA only if applicant D exerts effort less than e-(. Therefore
.  So, .  Applicant( )( | |) | |DDVA D A A A cV F e c e V cγ γ− − = − + ( ) 0,AD DDccA D A VD c
A
V V c e
F e e
V
− + ⎡ ⎤= ∀ ∈ ⎣ ⎦
D has a probability mass of  at zero.  The expected value of the game to applicant D is zero( )//1 D DA AV cV c−
by Claim 4.  When he exerts effort e 0  applicant D wins the place with value VD  only if0, DD
V
c⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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applicant A exerts effort less than e+(. So, VD FA(e+()-cD e=0. Therefore
. Applicant A puts zero probability on  by Claim 2.(( ) ( | |) | |, | |D DD Dc VA V cF e e eγ γ γ ⎤= − ∀ ∈ + ⎦ (0, ]γ
In each of the three ranges of ( the equilibrium distribution functions are continuous in (. They
are also continuous at the joins between ranges. For the lower join this can be seen by taking the left
limit of the equilibrium distribution functions as (60, which are the same as the distributions at (=0.
Likewise the continuity at the upper join between ranges can be seen by taking the right limit of the
distributions as  which are the same as the distributions when A D
A D
V V
c cγ → − .A DA DV Vc cγ = −
~
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Start with part B. If  then from Lemma 1 the expected academic achievement of0, ,A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
the disadvantaged (favored) applicant is given by
(1)
2/ /
0 0
f ( )
2
f f f fV c V c
fu u
f
u u f
Vc x cx x dx dx
V V c
⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫
which does not depend on ( and hence proves part b (i). The diversity of the student body is given by
the probability that the unfavored applicant is admitted
(2)
/
/
Prob f ( ) F ( )
( / ) ( ) /
1
2 /
f f
f f
V c
u u f
V c
f u u f f u f f
f u u u
x x dx
c V c c V c x V c
dx
V V V c
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
+
+
+
+
= − =
⎛ − + − ⎞ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫
∫
which does not depend on ( which proves part b (ii). In this range of (, the expected academic
achievement of the advantaged (unfavored) applicant is given by
(3)
/ /
f ( )
2
f f f fV c V c
f f
u
f f
c x V
x x dx dx
V c
γ γ
γ γ
γ
+ +
+ +
= = +∫ ∫
which is increasing in (. Comparing (1) and (3) at (=0 the expected score of the advantaged applicant
is greater than the expected score of the disadvantaged applicant since in this range the favored
applicant is from the disadvantaged background so  which proves part b (iv). Higher/ / ,u u f fV c V c>
( increases the expected score of the advantaged applicant, equation  (3), without changing the score
of the disadvantaged applicant, equation (1), which proves part b (iii).
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If   then from Lemma 1the expected academic achievement( ) ( ), 0 ,D A D AD A D AV V V Vc c c cγ ∈ − ∪ −
of the favored applicant is given by:
(4)( )2
0 0
f ( )
2
u u
u u
u
u
V V
c c
Vu u
f c
u u
xc cx x dx dx
V V
γ γ
γ
− −
= = −∫ ∫
while the expected academic achievement of the unfavored applicant is given by:
(5)( )2 2f ( ) 2
u u
u u
u
u
V V
c c
f f V
u c
f f
c x c
x x dx dx
V Vγ γ
γ
+ +
⎡ ⎤= = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫
Both of these expressions are strictly decreasing in  which proves part a (i). From Lemma 1, in thisγ
range of ( the probability that the unfavored applicant is admitted is given by: 
(6)
2/ /
2
uProb F ( ) f ( ) 2
u u u uV c V c
f u fu u
f u
u f u f u
c c cc x Vx x dx dx
V V V V cγ γ
γ γ
+ +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − = = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫ ∫
In the range as equation (6) is strictly decreasing in  Moreover( ), 0DDVcγ ∈ − .γ
(7)u0
/ / 1lim Prob
2 / 2 / 2
u u D D
f f A A
V c V c
V c V cγ →
= = <
therefore increasing  decreases the diversity of the student body and proves part a (ii).γ
If the probability that the unfavored applicant is accepted is given by( ), ,A D AA D AV V Vc c cγ ∈ −
equation (6) where f=D and u=A. Setting this expression equal to ½ and solving for ( yields
(8)
1/2
A A D
A A D
V V V
c c c
γ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦

the level of ( that results in full diversity. Since VA/cA>VD/cD,
(9)A D A
A D A
V V V
c c c
γ− < <
which proves part c (i). In this range of ( the expected academic achievement of the disadvantaged
student is given by (4) which is strictly decreasing in (. Since from Lemma 1 the equilibrium
distribution functions are continuous in (, so are the expected scores of the applicants, which proves
part c (ii). G
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
When (=0 the probability of a D applicant with effort e being admitted is FA(e) and the probability
of a A applicant with effort e being admitted is FD(e).  When (=0, u=A and f=D so from Lemma 1,
for all 0<e<VD /cD, FA(e)=cD e/VD while  FA(e)<FD(e) œ[ ]F ( ) ( / ) / .D A A D D A Ae V c c V c e V= − +
G( )0, / .D De V c∈
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
The expected academic quality of the admitted student (Q) is given by
(10)f ( ) F ( ) f ( ) F ( )u f f u
u f
Q x x x dx x x x dxγ γ= − + −∫ ∫
If then from Lemma 1 0, ,A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
(11)
/ /
2
0
f f f fV c V c
u f f u fu
u f u f u f
c c V c cVQ x x dx x dx
V V c c V V
γ
γ
γ
+
+ ⎛ ⎞= − + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫
hence Leibniz’ rule yields
(12)2 2 0
2 2
fu u A A D
u u f A A D
Vc V c V VQ
V c c V c cγ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ = − = − >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
So the academic quality of the admitted student in increasing in ( in this range.
If   then from Lemma 1equation (10) becomes( ) ( ), 0 ,D A D AD A D AV V V Vc c c cγ ∈ − ∪ −
 
(13)
//
2
0
u uu u V cV c
f u f u f u
f u f u f u
c c c c V VQ x dx x x dx
V V V V c c
γ
γ
γ
+
− + ⎛ ⎞= + − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫
hence Leibniz’ rule yields
(14)2 1 0
2
u f f fu u
u f u u f f
c c V VV VQ
V V c c c c
γ γ γγ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ⎪ ⎪= − + − − − − <⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
the sign of which can be seen from the fact that if (<0, Vu/cu<Vf/cf and if  thenA DA D
V V
c cγ > −
 Hence in these ranges of ( the expected academic quality of the admitted student is.fu
u f
VV
c c γ− >
strictly decreasing in  Since by Lemma 1 the equilibrium distribution functions are continuous in.γ
(, so is the expected academic quality of the admitted student. Hence the expected academic quality
of the admitted student is maximized at the top of the mildly favor D range of (, at
(15)ˆ A D
A D
V V
c c
γ = −
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If  then applicant D is favored and from Lemma 1 the expected achievement0, ,A D
A D
V V
c cγ ⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦
of an admitted student from a disadvantaged background (QD) is given by
(16)
/
2
0
1 1f ( ) F ( )
1 Prob 1 Prob
f fV c
u f
D f u
u u u ff
c c
Q x x x dx x dx
V V
γ= + =− −∫ ∫
since Probu is given by (2) and does not depend on (, QD does not depend on (. The expected
achievement of an admitted student from an advantaged background (QA) is given by
(17)/
1 f ( ) F ( )
Prob
( / )1
Prob
f f
A u f
u u
V c
f u u f f u u
u f u
Q x x x dx
c V c c V c c x
xdx
V V
γ
γ
γ
γ
+
+
= −
⎡ − − + ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫
∫
Since Probu does not depend on (, Leibniz’ rule yields
(18)( ) ( )2 22 02 Prob f f fuu f f fV V Vu f VA c c c cu f uc cQ V V γ γ γγ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − + + − >⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦
which is positive since in this range of (, Vu /cu >Vf /cf . The policy  does not change student bodyγˆ
diversity compared with (=0 by Lemma 2 part b (ii). G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The full diversity policy is derived in equation (8). Clearly  At the full( ) ( ), , .A D A AA D A AV V V Vc c c cγ γ∈ − =
diversity policy the expected effort of by an applicant from a disadvantaged background is lower than
with no preferential treatment by Lemma 2 part c (ii). The score gap at (=0 is given by equation (3)
minus equation (1):
(19)
2
0
Score Gap
2 2
D A D
D A D
V c V
c V cγ =
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
The score gap at  is given by the difference between (5) and (4):γ γ= 
(20)
2 2
2Score Gap
2 2
D A A A
D A A A
c V c V
V c V cγ γ
γ γ=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
Multiplying this out and plugging in from (8) for all squared terms and simplifying yieldsγ
(21)
0
Score Gap Score Gap
2
A A D A D
A A D A D
c V V V V
V c c c cγ γ γ
γ= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− = − − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

which is positive as long as
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(22)
2
A A D A D
A A D A D
c V V V V
V c c c c
γ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞> − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

Squaring both sides, plugging in  from (8) and simplifying, the difference in the score gaps isγ
positive as long as
(23)
3 2
4 A A D A D
A A D A D
V V V V V
c c c c c
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞> − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
which is always true. This can be seen by noticing that the (VD /cD) that maximizes the R.H.S. is
 but that even at this level the expression still holds. G13
D A
D A
V V
c c=
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
When (=0, the proportion of disadvantaged applicants who are admitted is given by (2) which is less
than ½. Hence  and indicate that increasing VD or decreasing
Prob
2 0D AD D A
c
V c V
∂
∂ = > 2Prob 2 0D A DD D A
c V
c c V
∂ −
∂ = <
cD will increase diversity. The academic achievement of the admitted class is given by (11). This
simplifies to
(24)
2
2 6
D A D
D A D
V c VQ
c V c
⎛ ⎞= + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
which is increasing in VD and decreasing in cD. The score gap is given by (19) which is shown to be
positive in the proof of Lemma 2 part b (iii).  Therefore
(25)Score Gap 2
2
A A D
D D A A D
c V V
V c V c c
⎛ ⎞∂ = −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠and
(26)2
Score Gap 2
2
A D A D
D D A A D
c V V V
c c V c c
⎛ ⎞−∂ = −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
Hence as long as  increasing VD or decreasing cD will decrease the score gap./ / 2D D A AV c V c>
 G
